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Note
An Improved Framework for Analyzing “Substantially
Similar” Patent Claims with Respect to the Inequitable
Conduct Defense
Michael Buschbach∗
With its decisions in Dayco Products1 and McKesson,2 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of
the materiality leg of the inequitable conduct defense. A patent
prosecutor’s duty of disclosure, the court found, extends to
rejections by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
examiner of “substantially similar” claims in co-pending
applications.
This Note addresses criticisms of those Federal Circuit
cases in the context of the purposes of the inequitable conduct
defense in order to formulate an improved framework for
analysis. Part I of this Note traces the development of the
inequitable conduct defense through Dayco Products and
McKesson as the Federal Circuit seeks an appropriate standard
for determining whether information is material and therefore
subject to disclosure. Part II of this Note analyzes those
decisions, discusses the difficulties inherent in substantial
similarity analysis, and considers the importance of prior art in
patent validity, infringement cases, and inequitable conduct
charges. This Note concludes that the Federal Circuit should
incorporate a comparison of the prior art referenced by the
applications into its substantial similarity framework.

©2009 Michael Buschbach.
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Michael Buschbach is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota. He
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1. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
2. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD
OF MATERIALITY FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS AND
FAILURES TO DISCLOSE
A. PATENTS AS A VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE WITH THE
GOVERNMENT
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to
grant an inventor an exclusive right to the exercise of his
invention,3 and that body has obliged through passage of the
Patent Act, which grants patent holders “the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the
invention into the United States . . . .”4 This exclusionary power
is properly characterized as a property right;5 a patent,
therefore, is a Congressional grant of property. However, only
“things which add to the sum of useful knowledge” are to be
granted patents.6 In exchange for the government grant of
property, the government requires actual innovation and that
the inventor set forth, via a written description, “the manner
and process of making and using [the invention, with sufficient
specificity] . . . as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to
make and use [it] . . . .”7 The description enters the public
3. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries . . . .” U.S CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1–8.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
5. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest
is the right to exclude others.”); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989) (“The federal patent system thus
embodies a carefully crafted bargain encouraging the creation and disclosure
of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for
the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years.”); Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (“The
patent laws ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ by rewarding
innovation with a temporary monopoly. The monopoly is a property right . . . .”
(internal citations omitted)).
6. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). This important
limitation, rooted in England’s Statute of Monopolies, prevents Congress from
granting patents to politically favored groups that provide little or no public
benefit. See id. at 5–6.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000); see also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The disclosure required by the
Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’”) (quoting Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6
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domain as a result, and the sum of society’s useful knowledge
increases.
B. CREATION OF THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE
Like any system of voluntary exchange, the patent system
is subject to misrepresentation, both fraudulent and innocent.
In contract law, one of the available remedies for
misrepresentation is rescission, even where fraudulent intent is
absent or not proved.8 Congress, through successive Patent
Acts, has provided for the repeal of a patent upon a showing
that, for example, the patent “was obtained surreptitiously by,
or upon false suggestion.”9 In addition, federal courts seek to
ensure that the public as a contractual party with the putative
inventor receives the benefit for which its government has
granted exclusive rights.10 One of the most important common
law developments in this regard was the creation of an
inequitable conduct defense to patent infringement.
An owner of a patent relies on the courts to enforce his
property rights against infringers—those using, making,
selling, or offering to sell, without authorization, inventions
covered by his patents.11 In 1945 in Precision Instrument
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,
the Supreme Court, relying on the equitable doctrine of clean
hands,12 announced that for the protection of the public:
Pet.) 218, 242 (1832) (referring to patent rights in exchange for innovation as a
“contract”).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1979) (contract is
voidable where “a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a
fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the other party”). The test for
inequitable conduct in contract law is different from that found in patent law
because it requires either fraudulent intent or a material misrepresentation,
but not both.
9. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 111 (1790); see also Robert J.
Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 37–38 (1993) (summarizing development of the
inequitable conduct defense).
10. See Scott D. Anderson, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and
Recommended Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 846–47 (1999) (“[s]ociety at
large is damaged when it receives a poor bargain.” ). Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that the laws passed by Congress to provide a reward for innovation are
to be construed so as not to “countenance[e] acts which are fraudulent or may
prove mischievous.” Grant, 31 U.S. at 242. “The public yields nothing which it
has not agreed to yield; it receives all which it has contracted to receive.” Id.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
12. “[H]e who comes into equity must come with clean hands.” Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
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Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or who
are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising
duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or
inequitableness underlying the applications in issue. This duty is not
excused by reasonable doubts as to the sufficiency of the proof of the
inequitable conduct nor by resort to independent legal advice. Public
interest demands that all facts relevant to such matters be submitted
formally or informally to the Patent Office, which can then pass upon
the sufficiency of the evidence. Only in this way can that agency act to
safeguard the public in the first instance against fraudulent patent
monopolies. Only in that way can the Patent Office and the public
escape from being classed among the “mute and helpless victims of
deception and fraud.”13

The respondent in Precision had repeatedly and
egregiously violated this rule during prosecution of its patents
at issue.14 As a result, the Court found those patents
unenforceable against the accused infringer.15
C. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF MATERIALITY
1. Striking a Balance to Avoid Overreaching
Presently, in order “[t]o prove inequitable conduct in the
prosecution of a patent, [the defendant] must have provided
evidence of affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact,
failure to disclose material information, or submission of false
material information, coupled with an intent to deceive.”16 The
analysis is performed in two steps comprising “first, a
determination of whether the withheld reference meets a
threshold level of materiality and intent to mislead, and
second, a weighing of the materiality and intent in light of all
the circumstances to determine whether the applicant’s
conduct is so culpable that the patent should be held
unenforceable.”17 “Both intent and materiality are questions of
fact that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”18
13. Id. at 818 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 816–20.
15. Id. at 816.
16. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH, 237 F.3d 1359,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc. 149 F.3d 1321,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation omitted).
17. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362–63
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Purdue Pharma, 237 F.3d at 1366).
18. Id. at 1362–63. If either materiality or intent fails to rise to the
requisite threshold, a court need not engage in the further analysis of
balancing the equities. See Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 398
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Questions of ‘materiality’ and ‘culpability’ are often interrelated and
intertwined, so that a lesser showing of the materiality of the
withheld information may suffice when an intentional scheme to
defraud is established, whereas a greater showing of the materiality
of withheld information would necessarily create an inference that its
nondisclosure was ‘wrongful.’19

But more than just those two factors will be considered. A
court must weigh materiality and intent in the totality of the
circumstances to find whether the equities warrant a
conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred.20
Since Precision, courts have struggled to establish a test
for materiality that properly balances the costs and benefits of
the defense of inequitable conduct. Provide a standard that is
too lenient, and charges of inequitable conduct are raised
during infringement hearings as a matter of course.21 A lenient
standard also makes it more likely that an otherwise valid
patent will be rendered unenforceable due to innocent mistakes
during prosecution or to errors during the trial. This fear is
compounded by the severity of the punishment: a finding of
inequitable conduct with respect to only one claim during the
prosecution of a patent application renders the entire patent
unenforceable.22 Thus, it is possible that claims otherwise
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
19. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Digital Equipment Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701,
716 (1st Cir. 1981)).
20. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Systems Corp., 72 F.3d 1577,
1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A conclusive list of the equities that may affect the
decision has not been established, but in the B.F. Goodrich case, the Federal
Circuit accepted the lower court’s determination that the complexity and
uncertainty of the on-sale bar and obviousness doctrines at the time justified
giving the patentee “the benefit of the doubt” with regard to intent. Id.
21. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418,
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost
every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”). The court went on
to remark that these accusations were: (1) rarely successful, (2) destroying
attorneys’ respect for one another, (3) when unsupported, a negative
contribution to justice. Id.; see also Ad Hoc Comm. on Rule 56 and Inequitable
Conduct, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, The Doctrine of Inequitable
Conduct and the Duty of Candor in Patent Procurement: Its Current Adverse
Impact on the Operation of the United States Patent System, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 74,
75 (1988) (“Estimates are that inequitable conduct is raised as a defense to
claims of patent infringement in 80% of the cases before the courts.”).
22. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
877 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Unenforceability may extend to other related patents, but
not necessarily. Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable
Conduct in Patent Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit
Cases and a Plea for Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
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unrelated to the particular act of inequitable conduct will be
unenforceable by virtue of their inclusion with a tainted claim
in a patent specification. In addition, the attorney that
prosecuted the patent faces sanction,23 and the exceptional
nature of inequitable conduct often justifies an award of
attorney fees when the patent is litigated.24 Of course, these
consequences redound to the party that raises the inequitable
conduct defense, when it is successful. It is unremarkable then
that the charge is so frequently raised when the benefits are so
great in relation to the simple expediency of the defense.25
An overly strict standard, meanwhile, risks unduly
restricting courts from pursuing the purposes that the
inequitable conduct doctrine is meant to serve, which are: (1) to
ensure that the PTO receives all facts relevant to a pending
patent application, and (2) to punish inequitable conduct to
protect the public against “fraudulent patent monopolies.”26
TECH. L.J. 277, 305 (1997). For example, patents bound by a terminal
disclaimer are not affected when inequitable conduct is found with respect to a
sister patent. Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharma., Inc. 417 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Baxter Int’l., Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“[W]here the claims are subsequently separated from those tainted by
inequitable conduct through a divisional application, and where the issued
claims have no relation to the omitted prior art, the patent issued from the
divisional application will not also be unenforceable due to inequitable conduct
committed in the parent application.”). The qualifications of the holding in
Baxter suggest that claims tainted by a prior finding of inequitable conduct
cannot be made clean simply by moving them from one application to another.
Rather, it is claims that are carriers of the inequitable conduct infection. See
Baxter, 149 F.3d at 1331.
23. See Edwin S. Flores & Sanford E. Warren, Inequitable Conduct,
Fraud, and Your License to Practice Before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299, 314 (2000). The
Commissioner of the PTO has authority to regulate patent attorneys, see 35
U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D), and may impose sanctions that include reprimands (public
and potentially private), suspensions, and exclusions, Flores & Warren, supra.
24. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Professor Chisum describes additional possible
consequences such as:
[L]iability for damages under the antitrust laws,. . . liability under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, [] liability under the federal
securities laws, and . . . recovery of prior royalties paid to the
patentee, [] loss of the attorney-client and work product privileges, . . .
and disciplinary action against the attorney or agent who is
registered to practice before the Patent and Trademark Office.
6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[6] (1992).
25. Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine: Lessons from Recent
Cases, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 719, 719 (2002).
26. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
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Because of the difficulty inherent in foreseeing the myriad
ways by which patent prosecutors may attempt to subvert the
process, as well as the myriad ways in which honest
practitioners suffer from benign negligence, the PTO and the
Federal Circuit continue to make adjustments to the
inequitable conduct standard.
2. Limitations of the Defense
Patent rights discourage additional innovation by third
parties in areas encompassed by a particular patent. An
unnecessarily granted patent, whether innocently or
scurrilously obtained, therefore comes at a high cost without a
concomitant benefit. Not only are there high potential
monopoly costs,27 but the public also may be forced to wait until
the patent expires before new developments in the area are
forthcoming. The prospect of potential monopoly pricing and an
empty competitive field provides strong incentive for applicants
to commit fraud.
Patents, once granted, carry a presumption of validity. The
inequitable conduct defense is one of the few means available
for overturning a patent and thus aids the public in combating
fraud. While it is an equitable defense and “serves as a shield”28
for the alleged infringer, society benefits from that infringer’s
806, 818 (1945). These policies have the secondary effect of improving the
quality of patents through the production and verification of information
related to patentability. CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DOCTRINE AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATENT
QUALITY
3
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=IPO_Annual_Meeting2&Templ
ate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15882.
27. Reference to patents as automatically conferring a temporary
monopoly is not necessarily accurate; rather, patents provide a meaningful
right to exclude. See Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Nowhere in any statute is a patent described as a
monopoly. The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very
definition of ‘property.’ That the property right represented by a patent, like
other property rights, may be used in a scheme violative of antitrust laws
creates no ‘conflict’ between laws establishing any of those property rights and
the antitrust laws.”). But see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (“The patent laws . . . reward[]
innovation with a temporary monopoly.”). Despite the conflict in the attitudes
of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit towards the idea of patents as
per se monopolies, one can see the logic in both positions. Patents may provide
substantial economic power, but there cannot be a monopoly in the ordinary
sense over a particular invention where there is no market for it.
28. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059,
1070 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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wielding of the shield when an improperly granted patent is
rendered unenforceable.29
Yet despite its potential, the inequitable conduct defense is
ineffective against many fraudulently obtained patents. Its
main limitation, apparent from its title, is that it can only be
raised by an accused infringer in a suit for infringement. The
patentee has no need to expose himself to the danger of losing
his monopoly where no infringement or arguable infringement
is taking place. Fortunately, this limitation is less likely to be a
significant bar in competitive fields where the inequitable
conduct defense is most useful in ensuring that the public
receives the benefit of its bargain.
Recall that under the contract theory rationale for the
patent system, the inequitable conduct defense is a means for
preventing a fraud on the public.30 The more likely it is that the
public has already been exposed to the information contained in
a patent application, the more vigilant the system must be to
avoid conferring duplicative benefits. Fields that are crowded
with patents make obtaining a new patent in the field difficult
because of an abundance of prior art.31 Applicants for patents
are more likely in such situations to engage in inequitable
conduct out of their desire for a patent.32 But the crowded
29. In this respect, the inequitable conduct “shield” not only deflects the
plaintiff’s attack but causes it to backfire.
30. Anderson, supra note 10.
31. If an invention has already been patented by a prior inventor, it is not
patentable by another, later inventor. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(g) (2000). In
addition, if the invention is only a meager (or “obvious”) improvement over
what is already in the public domain through patenting, publication, or other
public use (the prior art), the inventor is not entitled to a patent. Id. § 103.
32. One commentator noted that for new ventures in the pharmaceutical
and medical device industry,
[Y]ears of research and development, millions of dollars in costs,
massive venture capital funding, and extensive FDA related costs
have been expended to produce the one product around which the
company will be entirely built. For this company, all that work and
money must result in a patent, otherwise more mature companies will
drive the first company out. This is very real for a “one hit wonder”
genetic engineering company that has only one blockbuster drug and
the entire market capitalization is based on that drug. Therefore, for
this company, the sin qua non of its very existence is obtaining
adequate patent protection. The desire to obtain the patent becomes
obviously paramount.
Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants on Fire: Towards a Narrow Construction
for Inequitable Conduct as Applied to the Prosecution of Medical Device and
Drug Patent Applications, 72 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 669, 676 (2004).
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nature of the field also makes it more likely that a pertinent
new patent will be challenged, either during an infringement
action brought by the patentee33 or by a request for a
declaratory judgment by another party (most likely a
competitor).34 The competition, in other words, will do what is
necessary to avoid ceding the field. Though pursuing its own
interests, it acts as a private patent examiner that ensures the
public receives “all which it has contracted to receive.”35
Another weakness of the defense is that it is difficult to
prove. Soon after being established, the Federal Circuit adopted
the standard of proof for fraud announced by its predecessor,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.).36 The
C.C.P.A. in Norton v. Curtiss held that “proof of fraud must be
clear and convincing . . . . [and] the one asserting misconduct
carries a heavy burden . . . .”37
The private nature of the inequitable conduct defense,
most useful in a competitive field, as well as its “heavy
burden,”38 are important to keep in mind when considering the
standard that should apply to any subtest of the defense’s
elements.
3. The Patent and Trademark Office’s Administrative Efforts at
Balancing Risks
Inequitable conduct is a breach of the duty of candor
toward the PTO.39 Patent examiners, seeking to guard against
improvidently granted patents, have a difficult mandate. The
PTO has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a claimed invention is not entitled to a patent.40
A decreasing “number of examiners per thousand patents” are

33. “A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his
patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000) (“[A]ny court of the United States . . . may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking [a
declaratory judgment].”).
35. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 242 (1832).
36. Goldman, supra note 9, at 70; Kan. Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144,
1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
37. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 797 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
38. Id.
39. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437,
1457 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
40. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st
Century: Combating the Plague, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 147, 156 (2005).
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evaluating an increasing number of patent applications.41 The
PTO does not have full research facilities of its own to conduct
exhaustive searches of the prior art.42 In addition, the United
States does not subject patent applicants to a formal opposition
proceeding where competitors may produce relevant prior art
in order to prevent a patent from issuing.43 Rather, the PTO
imposes a duty of disclosure upon the applicant44 to ensure that
known prior art is set before the examiner so that he may make
an informed decision as to patentability.45
The PTO sets forth the duty to disclose in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
(“Rule 56”), which explains the rationale of the rule and
describes its intended scope.46 Rule 56 imposes a duty upon all
individuals associated with a claim to disclose information
known to them that is material to patentability.47 The duty
“exists with respect to each pending claim until the claim is
41. Id.
42. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc. 439 F.2d 1369,
1378 (5th Cir. 1970).
43. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 40, at 156.
44. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a,c) (2000).
Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent
application within the meaning of this section [and thus subject to the
duty to disclose information related to patentability] are: (1) Each
inventor named in the application; (2) Each attorney or agent who
prepares or prosecutes the application; and (3) Every other person
who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the
application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee
or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the
application.
Id.
45. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 40 at 156. See Beckman Instruments, 439
F.2d at 1379 (“[O]ur patent system could not function successfully if
applicants were allowed to approach the Patent Office as an arm’s length
adversary.”).
46. “The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent
examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the
Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to
patentability.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
47. Id. Once an applicant hires an attorney to prosecute a patent, the
scope of the duty greatly expands “because the knowledge and actions of
applicant’s attorney are chargeable to applicant.” FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co.
835 F.2d 1411, 1415 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1987). An applicant ignorant of material
information or its importance can nevertheless have his patent held
unenforceable for inequitable conduct. See David Hricik, The Risks and
Responsibilities of Attorneys and Firms Prosecuting Patents for Different
Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 333 (2000).
This could occur as a result of knowledge that his attorney happens to have as
a result of prosecuting a prior unrelated patent for a different client. Id.
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cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application
becomes abandoned.”48 There is no duty to disclose information
that is not material to the patentability of any existing claim.49
Neither is there a duty to conduct a search for prior art that
may invalidate the applicant’s claim.50 Disclosures are
accomplished by filing information disclosure statements with
the PTO.51 All disclosures must include “[a] list of all patents,
publications, applications, or other information submitted for
consideration by the Office.”52
In 1992, the PTO narrowed its definition of materiality in
Rule 56. The modified rule reiterated the PTO’s admonishment
that:
[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with
the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all
information known to that individual to be material to patentability
as defined in this section.53

However, where the former rule defined materiality as the
extent to which “a reasonable examiner would consider [the
information] important in deciding whether to allow the
application to issue as a patent,”54 the 1992 amendment opted
for more precision.
Under the amended Rule 56(b), the subjective standard of
the reasonable patent examiner is subjugated to an objective
standard.55 Rule 56(b)(1) identifies as material information
48. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a–c).
49. Id.
50. Nordberg Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The
relevant standard is “should have known.” Id. Therefore, “applicants may not
cultivate ignorance by ‘disregard[ing] numerous warnings that material
information or prior art may exist, merely to avoid actual knowledge of that
information or prior art.’” Jeanne C. Curtis et al., Litigation Issues Relevant to
Patent Prosecution—The Defense of Inequitable Conduct, in FUNDAMENTALS
OF PATENT PROSECUTION 2007
227, 233 (2007) (quoting FMC Corp. v.
Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 (1987)).
51. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2000).
52. Id. § 1.98.
53. Id. § 1.56(a).
54. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991). Under the former standard, the information
must nevertheless be minimally relevant to the patentability of a claim. See
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“We also emphasize that the pertinent inquiry is not whether
a reasonable examiner would want to be aware of a particular thing, but
whether, after he was aware of it, he would ‘consider it important’ in deciding
whether to reject one or more claims.”).
55. The new rule was not, however, “intended to constitute a significant
substantive break with the previous standard.” Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v.
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that contributes to establishing “a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim.”56 Rule 56(b)(2) provides an
alternative definition ascribing materiality to information
contrary to an argument made by the applicant in regard to a
dispute with the PTO over the patentability of a claim.57 Both
prongs of the standard disclaim information that is cumulative
to information already of record in the application.58 That is,
an applicant is not required to submit information similar to
prior art or other facts relevant to patentability when such
information is already before the examiner.
4. The Federal Circuit Ultimately Decides the Scope of the
Duty to Disclose Information Material to Patentability
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement.59
Because inequitable conduct claims are limited to patent
infringement actions, that court also has exclusive jurisdiction
over such claims concerning the prosecution of a patent.60
The rules promulgated by the PTO are not binding on the
Federal Circuit,61 but that court has generally tracked the
relatively broad scope of materiality set forth in Rule 56. The
court “has continually rejected a ‘but for’ standard for
materiality”62 and given deference to the version of Rule 56
Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Duty of
Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pts. 1 and 10) (explaining that the amendment to section 1.56 was intended to
clarify the lack of certainty in the previous materiality standard)).
56. Information is material where “[i]t establishes, by itself or in
combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a
claim . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1) (2000).
57. Information is material if “[i]t refutes, or is inconsistent with, a
position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability
relied on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.” §
1.56(b)(2).
58. § 1.56(b).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (2000).
60. See Cedric A. D’Hue, Disclosing an Improper Verb Tense: Are
Scientists Knaves and Patent Attorneys Jackals Regarding the Effects of
Inequitable Conduct?, 14 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.121, 124 (2006); Pro-Mold
& Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
61. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have not decided whether the standard for materiality
in inequitable conduct cases is governed by equitable principles or by the
Patent Office’s rules.”).
62. D’Hue, supra note 60, at 125. A “but for” standard in this context
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being applied by the PTO at the time the patent application at
issue is being processed.63 Applications processed after 1992
are therefore evaluated according to the more definite standard
of materiality found in the amended Rule 56.64
The Federal Circuit has held certain information to be per
se material and thus subject to the disclosure requirement.
These include, inter alia:
(1) prior art references not known to the examiner; (2) conduct
relevant to statutory bars; (3) documents required by the PTO,
submitted by the applicant, including data, date of invention
affidavit, and enablement affidavit; (4) references made immaterial
by amendments or deletion of claims; and (5) foreign patent office
search reports on a companion application . . . .65

It is not necessary that information be directly associated
with a particular claim in order for it to be material to that
claim’s patentability. For example, the Manual of Patent
Examiner Procedure states that “if a particular inventor has
different applications pending in which similar subject matter
but patently indistinct claims are present that fact must be
disclosed to the examiner of each of the involved
applications.”66 The Federal Circuit stated this duty through
would mean that only information that actually affected patentability, most
likely the existence of prior art, would be material. See Merck & Co., Inc. v.
Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1420–21 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In Merck,
the plaintiff essentially argued for a “but for” test when it asserted that
withheld prior art that did not render a patented invention obvious could not
be material. Id. at 1420. The Federal Circuit rejected that contention and
determined that because a reasonable examiner would consider the withheld
prior art important in deciding whether to issue the patent, it was material.
Id. at 1421. In other words, the information need only be within the
reasonable examiner’s realm of consideration. Id.
63. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394
F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The PTO ‘standard’ is an
appropriate starting point for any discussion of materiality . . . because that
materiality boundary most closely aligns with how one ought to conduct
business with the PTO.”).
64. This rule was in doubt as late as 2003, when the Federal Circuit in
Dayco Products declined to decide between the old and amended Rule 56
where, in the facts before it, the infringer had met the threshold of materiality
under either standard. Dayco Prods., 329 F.3d at 1364.
65. Anderson, supra note 10, at 856.
66. 2 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2001.06(b) (8th ed. 2007). The Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure does not have the force of law but does reflect the proper orientation
of a patent attorney toward the PTO. It strongly encourages disclosure and
warns against assumptions regarding the examiner:
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the lens of materiality when it earlier held in Akron Polymer
that “[a co-pending] application was highly material to the
prosecution of the [patent-in-suit], because it could have
conceivably served as the basis of a double patenting
rejection.”67 In 2003 that court further expanded the obligations
of an applicant with regard to co-pending applications in Dayco
Products.68
D. A REJECTION OF SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR CLAIMS IS
MATERIAL TO PATENTABILITY
1. Dayco Products—A Rejection of Substantially Similar Claims
is Material to Patentability
In Dayco Products, the Federal Circuit favorably reviewed
a lower court’s analysis of the materiality element of an
inequitable conduct defense.69 Dayco, the plaintiff in an
infringement action, had filed two families of related patent
applications with the patent office.70 The ‘196 applications and
the applications for the patents-in-suit were assigned to
Do not rely on the examiner of a particular application to be aware of
other applications belonging to the same applicant or assignee. It is
desirable to call such applications to the attention of the examiner
even if there is only a question that they might be “material to
patentability” of the application the examiner is considering. It is
desirable to be particularly careful that prior art or other information
in one application is cited to the examiner in other applications to
which it would be material. Do not assume that an examiner will
necessarily remember, when examining a particular application,
other applications which the examiner is examining, or has examined.
Id. § 2004(9) (internal citations omitted). The attitude reflected in the Manual
brings to mind the real estate admonition: “when in doubt, disclose, disclose,
disclose!” See Peter Zura, CAFC Affirms Finding of Inequitable Conduct for
Failing to Disclose Information, PETER ZURA’S 271 PATENT BLOG, May 22,
2007,
http://271patent.blogspot.com/2007/05/cafc-affirms-finding-ofinequitable.html (discussing McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med.,
Inc., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Close cases should be
resolved by disclosure, not unilaterally by the applicant.”).
67. Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d
1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Both applications were prosecuted before different
examiners in the PTO by the same law firm. Id. at 1381. The district court
found that “the responsible lawyers in [the firm] were well aware of the
existence and details of both applications.” Id.
68. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
69. Id. at 1367–68.
70. Id. at 1361.
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separate patent examiners.71 “The claims submitted in the ‘196
family of applications were in some respects substantially
identical to the claims in the patents-in-suit,”72 and “[t]he
applications in the ‘196 family included specific references to
members of the family of applications that issued as the
patents-in-suit.”73 Dayco did not inform the examiner of the
patents-in-suit of the pendancy of the ‘196 applications before
the other examiner.74 On three separate occasions, the
examiner assigned to the ‘196 applications rejected them on
obvious grounds,75 but Dayco’s prosecuting attorney never
notified the examiner of the patents-in-suit of these rejections
nor even of the patent on which the rejection was based.76 The
district court relied on this withholding of relevant information
as one of three reasons for granting summary judgment to the
defendant, rendering the patents-in-suit unenforceable.77
Dayco appealed the judgment, arguing that the existence of
the ‘196 application was irrelevant because, although it could
have served as the basis of a double patenting rejection of the
patents-in-suit, the patents-in-suit were subject to a terminal
disclaimer. The disclaimer limited the term of the patents-insuit to a period “much shorter than that of any patent that
conceivably could have issued from the [‘196] application.”78 In
other words, Dayco asserted that the ‘196 application did not
affect the patent rights that Dayco eventually received for the
patents-in-suit and that this was an appropriate test for
inequitable conduct.79 The Federal Circuit did not reject that
argument outright, opting instead to rely on the fact that nondisclosure of the ‘196 application permitted Dayco to receive
what was in effect a double patent that was not subject to a
common ownership limitation with respect to the patents-insuit.80 This limitation is an additional requirement for
overcoming a double patenting rejection by using a terminal
disclaimer.81 Consequently, Dayco’s non-disclosure of the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1365 (quoting Brief of Appellant).
See id.
Id. at 1365–66.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(c)(3) (2005).
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existence of the ‘196 application to the examiner did in fact
affect the rights of the patents-in-suit and were material.82
Having found that the ‘196 application was relevant, the
Federal Circuit turned to the district court’s determination that
the existence of an outstanding rejection of substantially
similar claims in that application was material. The court
affirmed this ground for unenforceability, holding that where
an examiner has issued a contrary decision after reviewing a
claim substantially similar to claims at issue in the patents-insuit, that “information meets the threshold level of materiality
under new Rule 56, in that ‘[i]t refutes, or is inconsistent with,
a position the applicant takes in . . . [a]sserting an argument of
patentability.’”83 The court also held that a reasonable
examiner would be substantially likely to consider such
information “important in deciding whether to allow an
application to issue as a patent”; thus, it also met the standard
for materiality under the former Rule 56.84
In addition to the references to Rule 56, the court stated
that “[w]ithout such a disclosure requirement ‘applicants [may]
surreptitiously file repeated or multiple applications in an
attempt to find a “friendly” Examiner.’”85 “Friendly” in this
context can refer to an examiner that is unsophisticated or
inexperienced, for patent applications and disclosures can be
complex and subject to different interpretations by examiners
with different technical backgrounds and experience.86 Two
heads are better than one, the court reasoned; therefore
knowledge of a potentially different interpretation (that
rejected a substantially similar claim) is information that an
examiner would consider important. Because the district court
did not engage in an analysis of intent to deceive the PTO with
regard to the rejection, however, the Federal Circuit remanded
for further proceedings on that issue.87
2. McKesson—”Substantially Similar” is not a Strict Standard
Four years after Dayco Products, the Federal Circuit again
82.
83.
84.
85.

Dayco Prods., 329 F.3d at 1365-66.
Id. at 1368 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2) (2002)).
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1367 (quoting ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW,
ANNUAL REPORT 1993-1994 (1994)).
86. Id. at 1368.
87. Id.
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confronted the issue of a non-disclosure of the rejection of
substantially similar claims in McKesson.88 The plaintiff
appealed the district court’s finding that the patent-in-suit was
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct by the prosecuting
attorney, Schumann.89
The facts of the case that concern the rejection of claims by
another examiner are similar to those of Dayco Products.
Schumann simultaneously prosecuted the application that led
to the patent-in-suit and another, similar application (the ‘149
application).90 The invention set forth in the ‘149 application
was “so similar” to the invention of the patent-in-suit “that
Schumann initially disclosed the same body of art with both
applications.”91 However, the applications were before different
examiners.92 Twice, the examiner of the ‘149 application
rejected the claims therein as anticipated by the prior art, but
in neither case did Schumann disclose these rejections to the
examiner of what became the patent-in-suit.93
The district court relied heavily on Dayco Products in its
analysis, restating its holding that “rejections are material if
the rejected claims were ‘substantially similar’ to the claims
pending . . . [within the application for the patent-in-suit].”94
Claims 15 and 16 within the ‘149 application “substantially
overlapped with the limitations” of a claim within the patentin-suit, and when those claims were rejected, that standard
was satisfied.95 In the second rejection, there again were
“substantially similar” claims that were rejected and those that
were permitted in the patents-in-suit. In describing the
similarity between the claims, the court noted that there was a
“striking resemblance” in elements of the claims.96 For
instance, the claims in both applications referenced a portable
handheld terminal, a “keyboard means,” a “display means,”
elements related to bar code readers, electromagnetic wave
88. See McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
89. Id. at 901, 912.
90. Id. at 904.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 906.
93. Id. at 905–06.
94. Id. at 910–11 (quoting slip opinion quoting Dayco Prod., Inc. v. Total
Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
95. Id. at 911 (quoting slip opinion).
96. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 2006 WL 1652518,
at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006).
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transceivers, and some form of wireless communication.97 In
addition, there were structural similarities. They all described
a three-node system involving a portable handheld terminal
communicating wirelessly with base stations that are linked to
a central computer, and they shared many important
limitations of the communication protocol.98 In its materiality
analysis the district court noted that Dayco Products found that
claims were “substantially similar” when “claims submitted in
the ‘196 family of applications were in some respects
substantially identical . . . .”99 It then applied this sub-test to
find the rejected ‘009 claims material to the prosecution of the
patent-in-suit.100
In its appeal, the petitioner argued that the “in some
respects identical test” was a less rigorous comparison than
was required by the Dayco Products holding; thus it failed to
respect the differences between the claims.101 A divided Federal
Circuit panel responded that materiality can be proven in a
number of ways,102 and that Dayco Products is simply a
particular example of what suffices.103 The court then diluted
the Dayco Products holding by stating although a showing of
substantial similarity between claims is sufficient, “rejected
claims in a co-pending application also need not be
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *17 (quoting Dayco Prod., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329
F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (emphasis in original).
100. Id. (“[T]he rejected ‘009 claims were ‘in some respects’ identical to the
‘716’s Claim 1, directly implicating the materiality of the ‘009 rejections to the
‘716 prosecution.”).
101. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 919
(Fed. Cir. 2007). The McKesson court identified four differences between the
patent-in-suit and the ‘149 application that were ignored by the district court.
Id. at 920. The court noted that these limitations were peripheral. Id. at 921.
Even if the district court had considered them (which the Federal Circuit did
not concede), the similarities regarding the overall structure of the systems
disclosed in the applications are far more important to the analysis. See id. at
920. It was this common structure that Schumann (the patent prosecutor)
relied upon when asserting his patentability argument. Id. Therefore, a
rejection of that assertion vis-à-vis the ‘149 application “would have been
considered important by any reasonable examiner” reviewing the application
of the patent-in-suit. Id. Presumably, the court accepted the old Rule 56
“reasonable examiner” standard in McKesson because the allegedly
inequitable conduct occurred in 1987, prior to the 1992 amendment to the rule.
102. Id. at 919 (citing Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437
F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
103. See id.
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substantially similar in order to be material.”104 Thus, the
terminology of the subtest that is used, whether “in some
respects identical,” “substantially similar,” or “substantial
similarity ‘in content and scope,’” is irrelevant.105 The
important and underlying question is whether the evidence
“clearly and convincingly proves materiality in one of the
accepted ways.”106 The court found that the proffered
differences between the claims in the ‘149 application and the
patent-in-suit were insufficient to deprive the examiner’s
rejections of materiality.107
The Federal Circuit’s analysis in McKesson broadened its
holding in Dayco Products by turning that holding back around
on itself. In Dayco Products, the court held that claims needed
to be substantially similar before a rejection of one would be
material information with respect to the prosecution of another.
This was so because a reasonable examiner would find such
information helpful. In McKesson however, the court dismissed
the requirement of substantial similarity, referring to it as
sufficient, but not necessary. Instead, it inflated the relatively
narrow standard of materiality (vis-à-vis claim rejections)
established by Dayco Products to encompass whatever “would
have been considered important by any reasonable
examiner.”108 The extension has multiplied the anxieties of
patent prosecutors.109

104. Id.
105. Id. at 920.
106. Id. Courts have applied many standards of materiality since the
Supreme Court created the inequitable conduct defense, though not all have
been accepted by the Federal Circuit. They include (1) the objective “but for”
test, where the patent should not have issued due to the information; (2) the
subjective “but for” test, where the examiner would not have approved the
application without the misrepresentation; (3) the “but it may have” test,
where the information may have influenced the examiner; (4) the “reasonable
examiner” test (old Rule 56); and the (5) new Rule 56 test. See Digital Control,
Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 37
C.F.R. § 1.56(a). For patent applicants, the result is that they must consider
information under all five standards and disclose if it meets the materiality
level for any of them; it is impossible to foresee a priori which test a court may
decide to apply.
107. McKesson, 487 F.3d at 921.
108. Id. at 920.
109. See Kevin E. Noonan, Federal Circuit Increases Risk for Biotechnology
DOCS,
May
23,
2007,
Patent
Prosecutors,
PATENT
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/2007/05/the_federal_cir.html.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. THE BROAD RULE OF MCKESSON IMPOSES ADDITIONAL
BURDENS ON PATENT PROSECUTORS WARY OF FUTURE
LITIGATION
With McKesson, the Federal Circuit may have unwittingly
contributed to the plague of charges of inequitable conduct
while simultaneously increasing the difficulty in procuring
complex patents.
1. The McKesson holding provides a vague standard that
increases the uncertainty of patent validity.
An open-ended test, variously described in McKesson as “in
some respects identical,” “substantially similar,” or “substantial
similarity in content and scope,” provides opportunity for
infringement defendants to assert the inequitable conduct
defense through creative wordsmithing. Such defendants can
point to negligible similarities between two previously copending applications and claim that these similarities make
the applications “in some respects identical.” In like manner,
broad similarity of subject matter between two previously copending applications provides fertile ground for arguments
regarding their “substantial similarity in content and scope.”
For complex patents, such as those found in the biotechnology
arena, sweeping similarity arguments will be difficult for
opponents to rebut and for courts to evaluate.110 These
examples demonstrate that McKesson considerably slackened
the constraints on potential arguments that may be raised by
infringement defendants whenever such defendants have the
fortuity of co-pending applications by the plaintiff during the
prosecution of its patent-in-suit. This effect contravenes the
PTO’s and the Federal Circuit’s goal of reducing the frequency
of inequitable conduct charges and increases the burden on the
federal courts.111 Moreover, the unpredictability that results
110. This concern is reflected in a dissent by Judge Newman from a case in
which the Federal Circuit sustained a finding of inequitable conduct. She
feared that “[t]he uncertainties of the processes of scientific research, the
vagaries of the inductive method, the complexities of patent procedures, and
the twists of hindsight, all provided grist for this pernicious mill [of
inequitable conduct accusations].” Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp.,
323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting).
111. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed.
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from the vague and open-ended McKesson rule will likely
attenuate business investment in innovation, with concomitant
harms to actual invention.112
2. The vague standard of the McKesson holding increases the
cost of procuring complex patents.
To avoid the possible consequences of a McKesson-based
challenge to the enforceability of a patent, patent prosecutors
now face a heightened burden in researching the course of
prosecution for co-pending applications that may have
similarities that would meet the open-ended McKesson test. In
Dayco Products, the Federal Circuit established that applicants
must research office actions directed toward related
applications to determine whether the examiner had rejected
“substantially similar” claims.113 McKesson affirmed that
principle, and expanded the duty by expanding the meaning of
“substantially similar” to include the rejection of any claim that
“clearly and convincingly proves materiality in one of the
accepted ways.”114 Because this limitation is commensurate
with the ability of an infringement defendant to establish
similarities between two applications, the applicant must bring
creativity to the research process in order to anticipate
Cir. 1988); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (“The [amended Rule
56] as promulgated will provide greater clarity and hopefully minimize the
burden of litigation on the question of inequitable conduct before the
Office . . . .”). Judge Newman expressed similar concern in her brief McKesson
dissent. Focusing on what she viewed as the failure of the defendant to
demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent, Judge Newman
wrote, “[t]o avoid the inequity resulting from litigation-driven distortion of the
complex procedures of patent prosecution, [clear and convincing evidence was
required]. This court returns to the ‘plague’ of encouraging unwarranted
charges of inequitable conduct, spawning the opportunistic litigation that here
succeeded despite consistently contrary precedent.” McKesson, 487 F.3d at
926–27.
112. See Paul M. Janicke, On the Causes of Unpredictability of Federal
Circuit Decisions in Patent Cases, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 93
(2005). Professor Janicke mentions three benefits of legal predictability in the
patent arena. First, companies face less risk in their business decisions
relating to patents. Id. A second reason, strongly related to the first, is that
“[l]awyers are better enabled to advise clients on the impact of a particular
course of action.” Id. Finally, on a societal level, “we feel a certain sense of
added stability if we have a statutory legal system . . . [where] we can tell
which side is ‘right under the law.’” Id.
113. See David Hricik, Where the Bodies Are: Current Exemplars of
Inequitable Conduct and How to Avoid Them, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 287,
314 (2004).
114. McKesson, 487 F.3d at 920.
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arguments that may be propounded in future litigation. Such
creative research is time-consuming and expensive,
particularly for small to mid-size firms that may not have the
resources to create and maintain a database containing readily
searchable details of a particular patent’s prosecution history.
To be sure, the establishment of the Patent Application
Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) system by the PTO can reduce
this burden to some degree.115 PAIR provides a means for
obtaining patent application status, including real-time status
information for all action taken by the PTO for an application
that is in the process of examination.116 Nevertheless, the task
of comparing applications to one another under the broad
rubric of “substantial similarity” still falls to the applicant.
The McKesson rule should not affect the majority of most
patent practitioners’ applications. Its effects will be felt
disproportionately by those practicing in the biotechnology field
and fields of similar high complexity. This is a result of the
relatively larger number of divisional and continuation
applications filed in support of biotechnology inventions as
opposed to those filed in other technical fields.117 Divisional and
continuation applications result in patent prosecutors having
multiple applications simultaneously pending with the PTO.118
This situation tends to increase the probability of having a
substantially similar claim in a co-pending application rejected,
thus triggering the duty to disclose under the Dayco Products
and McKesson standards.
However, the fact that the consequences of McKesson will
be felt primarily by those prosecuting complex patents over a
relatively long period of time is not an argument in its favor.
Rather, it is an additional cost born by those already seeking
115. See Noonan, supra note 109.
116. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, FAQ—Patent Application
Information Retrieval (PAIR), http://www.uspto.gov/ebc/pair/pair_faq.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
117. See Noonan, supra note 109.
118. A “continuation application” is a patent application filed by an
applicant who wishes to pursue additional claims to an invention disclosed,
but not claimed, in an earlier application that is still pending before the PTO
and has not been abandoned. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000). A “divisional
application” may be filed where an original application contains two or more
independent and distinct inventions, prompting the PTO to require that the
applicant restrict his application to one of the inventions. Id. § 121. Any
remaining inventions may be claimed in other applications that will share the
filing date of the original invention. Id.
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the most expensive and thus typically among the most
economically significant patents.119 Patent prosecution costs
are a function of, inter alia, the number of claims, the
complexity of the application’s subject matter, and the time to
ultimate disposition of the application.120 Highly complex
patents involving continuation and divisional applications are
thus among the most expensive to procure. The McKesson rule
will increase these expenses by requiring patent prosecutors to
investigate and bring to the attention of the examiner the
course of prosecution of co-pending applications, provided that
PTO activity on those applications might be material to the
patent under examination. These added transaction costs
resulting from McKesson are funds that could be more
productively directed toward research and development or
investment returns.121
B. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY, PRIOR ART, AND A PROPOSAL FOR
AN IMPROVED SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY FRAMEWORK
1. There are difficulties inherent in determining substantial
similarity.
Determining substantial similarity is a challenge for courts
in a number of contexts.122 Within the patent field alone, issues
regarding similarity are found in such topics as the doctrine of
equivalents,123 double patenting rejections,124 and obviousness
119. See generally John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of
Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31 (2007). Economically trivial patents are
not worth the cost of procuring them, because they provide little, if any, return
on the investment in prosecution. See id.
120. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639 n.44 (2002).
121. See Donald S. Chisum, supra note 22, at 317–18. Professor Chisum
writes that the severe sanction for violating the duty of candor requirements,
such as that found in McKesson, creates substantial incentives for patent
prosecutors to tread carefully. Id. at 317. He notes that this incentive is not
cost free, however, because the excessive assertion of the sanction “retard[s]
the overall policies supporting the patent system, which include providing
incentives for research and development and the disclosure of new
technology.” Id. at 317–18.
122. See Donald F. McGahn II, Copyright Infringement of Protected
Computer Software: An Analytical Method to Determine Substantial
Similarity, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 88, 90–91 (1995) (discussing
the variety of tests for substantial similarity fashioned by courts in the context
of copyright infringement).
123. Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not
literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be
found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused
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analysis.125 Many of the challenges parallel the criticisms of the
McKesson rule made in this Note. For instance, a vague
standard of similarity leads to uncertainty in the field in which
the standard is applied. Unable to determine the proper scope
of a patent’s (or a copyright’s) exclusionary right, competitors
may be reluctant to invest in competing, but similar,
technologies and arts. On the other hand, an inflexible rule
may not sufficiently protect inventors and artists from
competitors that are able to produce a competing product that
appears substantially identical to the original in form and
function.126 Thus, the choice of test for substantial similarity in
any legal context must be carefully crafted to reflect the
competing policies in that context.
2. The prior art is the statutory focus of validity analysis but
not of inequitable conduct analysis.
The public should receive “all which it has contracted to
receive.”127 It was for this purpose that the inequitable conduct
defense was created.128 The invention that the prospective
patentee brings to the government must be an advance over
what is already known to the public. If this requirement is not
met, the person’s application for a patent shall be denied
according to any of the novelty or statutory bar provisions
product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 17 (1997)
(citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950)).
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (granting inventors the right to “a patent”).
Courts have fashioned a rule against granting multiple patents for the same
or for a substantially similar invention based upon the article “a” within 35
U.S.C. § 101, subject to certain exceptions for common ownership. See In re
Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441–42 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (“A patent may not be obtained though
the invention is not identically disclosed or described . . . [in the written
description] . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious . . . .”).
126. This consideration is the policy foundation for the judicially created
doctrine of equivalents. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343
(1854) (“The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public
are at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or
proportions.”).
127. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 , 242 (1832).
128. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 818 (1945).
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relating to prior art found in the Patent Act.129 Because the
validity of a patent depends primarily upon overcoming the
relevant prior art, a court’s evaluation of the conduct of an
applicant toward the PTO should likewise focus primarily on
the relationship between the claims and any references that
will defeat the patentability of those claims. The PTO appears
to recognize this through the duty of disclosure that it imposes.
Recall that, as revised in 1992, Rule 56 identifies as
material, and thus subject to disclosure, information that
contributes to establishing “a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim.”130 The prior art provides the
majority of the basis for what a reasonable examiner should
consider useful in determining the patentability of an
invention; it is also the most significant source of information
that may establish a prima facie case of unpatentability of a
claim. Indeed, it was the criticism of the reasonable examiner
standard as excessively vague and unrelated to other, more
fundamental concepts in patent law that led the PTO to revise
the prior Rule 56 toward a standard of prima facie
unpatentability.131 The revision properly shifts the focus of the
duty of disclosure from the examiner toward the prior art.132
In the context of an inequitable conduct analysis
considering PTO actions on co-pending applications, such as
that presented in Dayco Products and McKesson, the prior art
has not been central to the Federal Circuit’s holdings. In the
Dayco Products and McKesson holdings discussed in Part I, the
court ignored its recent trend in materiality analysis toward
the prior art and away from the actions of the examiner. In
both cases, the basis for finding inequitable conduct on the part
of the patentee was a rejection of similar claims in a co-pending
129. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2000). The novelty and statutory bars, as these
provisions are known, prevent a person from receiving a patent on inventions
that, inter alia, are already patented, “described in printed publication,” or
“known or used by others.” Id.
130. Information is material where “[i]t establishes, by itself or in
combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a
claim . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1).
131. Chisum, supra note 22, at 296.
132. The revised Rule 56 does not ignore the course of patent prosecution
before the examiner, however. Section 1.56(b) retains reference to the Patent
Office, although it does so in a manner that likewise shifts the focus to
patentability. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2); see also Goldman, supra note 9, at 72
(“[I]t is clear that the courts believed that the underlying purpose of requiring
the disclosure of material art was to enable the PTO to assess fairly the merits
of an application against the statutory criteria for patentability.”).
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application by an examiner. The court did not scrutinize the
basis for the rejection of the similar claims in the co-pending
application. It did not consider whether such rejections were
proper in light of the prior art, and consequently, whether the
basis of those rejections would have actually served to
undermine the patentability of the claims in the patents-insuit. In other words, the materiality inquiry did not align with
the purpose of the inequitable conduct defense, which is to give
force to the duty of disclosure, thus increasing the likelihood
that a granted patent will in fact be an improvement over the
relevant prior art. The Federal Circuit should reconsider its
approach in this arena.
3. The Federal Circuit should include a comparison of the prior
art shared by the co-pending applications as a means of
screening for substantial similarity.
Federal Circuit jurisprudence in the materiality prong of
inequitable conduct analysis would be improved were it to focus
not on the similarities between the claims shared by co-pending
applications, but on a comparison of the prior art referenced
among the applications. In this proposed revision of its current
framework, a determination of substantial similarity between
the claims of co-pending applications will only be found where
there is a substantial amount of overlapping prior art that
could be referenced against the co-pending applications. The
proposed framework will not prevent a finding of substantial
similarity where the applications do not share overlapping
prior art. However, such a finding should become significantly
less likely in the absence of such overlap. Neither will the
revision necessitate a finding of substantial similarity where
the applications do share overlapping prior art, though such a
finding will be significantly more likely where such overlap is
present. The degree to which substantial similarity is present
will be commensurate with the proportion of prior art in
common.
A comparison of the common prior art will have several
salutary effects and help to ameliorate many of the criticisms
leveled against the Federal Circuit in this area. First, it will
reduce the ambiguity of the open-ended McKesson holding.
Prior art is, unlike claims, discrete and easily comparable.
Other benefits, which are related to the decrease in ambiguity,
are that while the proposed framework does not fully obviate
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the need to analyze claims in all cases, it should clarify and
ease the duties of patent prosecutors and make inequitable
conduct litigation more predictable.
Patent prosecutors by now know of their responsibility to
disclose co-pending applications where the examiner has
rejected “substantially similar” claims,133 but the difficulty
under the current jurisprudence remains in knowing which
applications’ claims will satisfy that test. Where prior art is the
focus of the inquiry, a relatively simple check of other
applications pending with the PTO will permit an applicant to
determine the general scope of his obligations to the PTO in
this area. It is likely that large firms prosecuting many complex
patents, such as those in the biotechnology arena, already have
a database application containing pending applications and
their characteristics (including prior art disclosed in the
information disclosure statement). In this instance, a query of
this database for prior art in common will perform the bulk of
the necessary research, greatly reducing the burden on patent
prosecutors.
A less ambiguous standard will likely lead to fewer charges
of inequitable conduct. This consequence follows for two
reasons. First, patent prosecutors will better understand their
duty toward the PTO, the burden accompanying that duty will
be lower, and thus prosecutors will be more prone to carry it
out. Second, a focus on the prior art does not lend itself to
interminable arguments regarding the substantial similarity of
one claim to another. Instead, comparing the references shared
between applications is a simple matter; this practice has the
effect of changing the cost-benefit calculus of charging
inequitable conduct. For where creative comparisons of claims
that are substantially unrelated may nevertheless be accepted
under the McKesson tests of “substantially similar in content
and scope” or “in some respects identical,” they are less likely to
withstand scrutiny where a comparison of the relevant prior
art does not reveal any substantial degree of overlap. Because
they are therefore less likely to succeed, fewer meritless
charges of inequitable conduct will be brought as a result of
this revision, thus providing some relief from the present
“plague.”134
133. See Hricik, supra note 113, at 311–13.
134. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d at 1421 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major
patent case has become an absolute plague.”).
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Finally, a focus on the prior art under this proposed
revision more closely aligns inequitable conduct analysis with
patent validity analysis. This creates consistency between those
two areas of patent law. It also, in accordance with the revised
Rule 56 and recent trends in the materiality determination,
will move the Federal Circuit toward scrutinizing the relevant
prior art as opposed to the actions of the examiner. Recall that
a Dayco Products and McKesson-style analysis directs federal
courts to determine whether the claims of the patent-in-suit are
substantially similar to already rejected claims of another
application at the time the patent-in-suit was being prosecuted.
This question is one step removed from the question typically
relevant for determining whether a claim is valid: “Is this claim
a nonobvious improvement over the prior art?” A necessary
ingredient for answering that question is the content of the
prior art. By comparing the prior art in common, rather than
the claims, the proposed framework is more relevant to the
determination of whether the claims of the patent-in-suit are
novel and nonobvious. This has the effect of ensuring that the
alleged inequitable conduct under scrutiny was actually
relevant to the disposition of the claims by the examiner, an
important goal if the scope of the inequitable conduct defense is
to be constrained.
4. The Proposed Framework for Analysis Leads to Results
Consistent with Dayco Products and McKesson.
Changing the framework for analysis in this area to focus
on the prior art would not require the Federal Circuit to
abandon its results in Dayco Products or McKesson. In Dayco
Products, the applications in the ‘196 family, which contained
the rejected claims on which the inequitable conduct holding
was based, “included specific references to members of the
family of applications that issued as the patents-in-suit.”135 The
overlapping prior art was the application for the patent-in-suit
itself. According to the proposed framework, the overlap is
substantial; it includes the whole of another application. This
makes it highly likely that a rejection of claims in either the
application for the patents-in-suit or the application in the ‘196
family will be highly material to the disposition of the claims in

135. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358,
1361(Fed. Cir. 2003).
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the co-pending application and thus subject to the duty of
disclosure. The Federal Circuit in Dayco Products likewise
determined that the rejections were subject to disclosure,
though on the basis of the substantial similarity between the
claims.136
McKesson leads to a similar conclusion. In that case, the
attorney prosecuting the patents simultaneously prosecuted
the application that led to the patent-in-suit and another,
similar application (the ‘149 application).137 The attorney had
“disclosed the same body of prior art with both applications.”138
The Federal Circuit found that the proffered differences
between the claims in the ‘149 application and the patent-insuit were sufficiently similar to make a rejection of claims in
either material to the disposition of claims in the other.139
Under the proposed framework, however, a court would not
look primarily to the similarity between the claims; it would
consider the prior art. Clearly, the identical set of prior art
disclosed in both applications at issue in McKesson is
substantially overlapping. Therefore, this method of analysis
results in a similar result—a finding of the materiality of the
rejection of claims in a co-pending application.
III. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit in Dayco Products and McKesson
established an ambiguous standard for substantial similarity
among patent claims in inequitable conduct cases. The court’s
jurisprudence in this area is justly criticized for increasing the
burden on patent prosecutors, contributing to the plague of
inequitable conduct charges, and discounting the importance of
prior art to the evaluation of a patent’s validity. By
incorporating a comparison of prior art among co-pending
applications and focusing less on the similarity between claims,
the court could clarify the duty of disclosure and attenuate
many of these criticisms. Comparison of referenced prior art is
a simple and discrete process, which would ease the burden on
patent prosecutors. In addition, it will make a determination of
the materiality of a rejected claim in a co-pending application
136. Id. at 1366 (“The basis for establishing unpatentability is the potential
double patenting rejection . . . .”).
137. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 904
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 921.
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clearer and more predictable, resulting in fewer charges of
inequitable conduct. Finally, because prior art is typically
central to a determination of patent validity, the proposed
revision brings inequitable conduct jurisprudence in closer
alignment with patent validity analysis.

